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Abstract - The Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) of the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Radioactive Waste 
Management Committee in co-operation with the European Commission (EC) is conducting a project to develop a greater 
understanding of how to achieve the necessary integration for successful design, construction, testing, modelling, and 
assessment of engineered barrier systems. The project also seeks to clarzfy the role that the EBSplays in assuring the overall 
safety of a repository. A framework for the EBS Project is provided by a series of workshops that allow discussion of the wide 
range of activities necessary for the design, assessment and optimisation of the EBS, and the integration of this information 
into the safety case. The topics of this series of workshops have been planned so that the EBSproject will work progressively 
through the main aspects comprising one cycle of the design and optimisation process. 
This paper seeks to conzmunicate key results from the EBSproject to a wider audience. The paper focuses on two topics 
discussed at the workshops: process issues and the role of modelling. ' 
I. INTRODUCTION system (EBS) that comprises the man-made, engineered 
materials of the repository. 
The development and implementation of acceptable 
repository concepts for radioactive waste management The "Engineered Barrier System" represents the 
may best be approached through an inclusive and open man-made, engineered materials of a repository, including 
and transparent stepwise decision-making process [I]. A the waste form, waste canisters, buffer materials, backfill, 
key input to the decision-making process on whether and and seals [3]. 
how to proceed from one stage of waste management to 
the next is a safety case for the repository. 11. THE NEA EBS PROJECT 
The safety case is an integration of arguments and 
evidence that describe, quantify and substantiate the 
safety, and the level of confidence in the safety, of the 
geological disposal facility [2]. 
Repositories for deep disposal of radioactive 
waste typically rely on a multi-barrier concept in which 
several complementary barriers are designed to contain 
and isolate the waste from the biosphere. The multi- 
barrier system typically comprises the natural geological 
barriers provided by the repository host rock and any 
overlying rock formations, and an engineered barrier 
The Integration Group for the Safety Case (IGSC) of 
the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Radioactive Waste 
Management Committee in co-operation with the 
European Commission (EC) is conducting a project to 
develop a greater understanding of how to achieve the 
necessary integration for successful design, construction, 
testing, modelling, and assessment of engineered barrier 
systems. The project also seeks to clarify the role that the 
EBS plays in assuring the overall safety of a repository 
[3,41. 
A framework for the EBS Project is provided by a 
series of workshops that allow discussion of the wide 
range of activities necessary for the design, assessment 
and optimisation of the EBS, and the integration of this 
information into the safety case. The topics of this series 
of workshops have been planned so that the EBS project 
will work progressively through~the main aspects 
comprising one cycle of the design and optimisation 
process [4], [ 5 ] ,  [ 6 ]  (Fig.1). 
This paper seeks to communicate key results from the 
EBS project to a wider audience. The paper focuses on 
two topics discussed at the workshops: process issues and 
the role of modelling. 
111. ROLE OF THE EBS 
The main functions of EBS components can be 
surnrnarised as follows [3]: 
> The waste form is designed to provide a stable 
matrix that is resistant to leaching and gives slow 
rates of radionuclide release for the long-term. 
> The container/overpack is designed to facilitate 
waste handling, emplacement and retrievability, 
and to provide containment for up to 1,000 years 
or longer depending on the waste type and 
disposal concept. 
9 The bufferhackfill is designed to stabilise the 
repository excavations and the thermo-hydro- 
mechanical-chemical conditions, and to provide 
low permeability andlor diffusivity, andlor long- 
term retardation of radionuclide migration. 
9 Seals are designed to prevent releases via tunnels 
and shafts and to prevent access to the repository. 
These functions have been taken into consideration 
throughout the discussions at the project workshops. 
IV. APPROACH TO PERFORMANCE AND 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
A systematic approach can help to build confidence 
in the performance assessment (PA) and safety 
assessment (SA) models that form part of the safety case. 
Such an approach may include the following elements: 
1. A comprehensive consideration of features 
events and processes (FEPs). 
2. Quantification of uncertainty and variability. 
3. Sensitivity analyses. 
4. Development of understanding, confidence 
building and iterative model development. 
Optimisation 
through 
feedback and 
iteration 
Fig. 1. The EBS Project Optimisation Cycle. 
One of the key aims of a systematic FEPs analysis is 
to provide assurance that the relevant processes have been 
identified and treated in an appropriate way. It is 
important that process models and performance and safety 
assessment models include the potentially significant 
FEPs, and that the reasons for excluding FEPs from the 
models are well justified and traceably recorded. 
Uncertainty is inherent in all studies. Several types of 
uncertainty can be distinguished relating to uncertainty in 
future events and scenarios, in parameter values and the 
underlying data, and in conceptual models. Further 
complexity is introduced by spatial heterogeneity and 
variability in the properties of the wastes, the EBS 
materials, and the repository host rocks. Information 
gathering activities should be directed at reducing the 
most significant uncertainties as far as this is practicable. 
However, because of variability in the near field and EBS, 
and limited understanding about how processes will 
operate in the future; uncertainty cannot be completely 
eliminated. 
Adopting a clear strategy for model development 
across an entire waste disposal programme and the use of 
consistent approaches to the treatment of uncertainty can 
help when comparing models and model results. For 
example, it is important to know where conservative 
assumptions or parameter values have been used to take 
account of uncertainties and bound the effects of 
particular processes. 
Many processes operating within the EBS are 
complex andlor nonlinear, and many strong process 
couplings exist. This is particularly the case for high-level 
waste (HLW) and spent fuel disposal systems where 
heating effects are coupled to mechanical and 
hydrogeochemical processes. In such circumstances it can 
be difficult to identify the most important uncertainties 
and sensitivities from a simple evaluation of model 
results. Structured approaches to sensitivity analysis can 
help to: 
9 Determine which variables have the greatest 
impact on the overall uncertainty in model 
outcomes. 
P Examine what happens when the system is 
stressed via unfavourable parameter values, 
assumptions, or alternative conceptualisations. 
P Identify relevant aspects of individual process 
models for incorporation into system-wide PAS. 
A systematic programme of work will be needed to 
build confidence in process models and PAISA models. 
Building confidence in models is an iterative process that 
can benefit from the implementation of the steps 
discussed above as well as iteration between model 
development, assessments, data collection, and peer 
review. 
V. EBS PROCESS ISSUES 
EBS Project Workshop 2 [7] focused on the 
processes that may influence the performance of the EBS. 
V.A. Identifying and Considering Processes 
The processes that could occur within an 
underground repository for radioactive waste are well- 
known and their significance to each national programme, 
repository concept and repository site is being assessed. 
The more advanced programmes have developed and are 
actively using established approaches for assessing the 
overall safety of waste disposal and the associated 
uncertainties. These assessments are also being used in an 
iterative fashion to refine the design of the repository and 
arrive at solutions for waste disposal that not only comply 
with or exceed relevant safety standards, but also ensure 
that the repository can accommodate the wastes in an 
efficient and cost effective manner. 
Radioactive waste repositories will need to remain 
operational and receive radioactive waste for a period of 
the order of 100 years. Increased attention is now being 
given to assessing the potential effects of the processes 
that could occur during this long 'pre-closure' period. 
These 'pre-closure processes' will determine the state of 
the repository at the time of repository closure. The 
majority of the 'pre-closure processes' are the same as 
those that have already been included in assessments of 
longer-term 'post-closure' repository safety. 
However, some FEPs have particular relevance in the 
earlier part of repository evolution and, owing to recent 
trends towards longer operating periods and phased 
repository closure strategies, these FEPs may require 
greater attention than they have received in previous 
assessments. 
Key questions include: 
9 How to guarantee the quality and maintenance of 
EBS materials during the pre-closure phase? 
9 How to avoid affecting the safety functions of 
the host rock (e.g. de-saturation) during the pre- 
closure phase? 
9 How to minirnise stray materials (oil, equipment, 
metals) during the pre-closure phase? 
Other examples of 'pre-closure FEPs' include, 
drawdown, piping, ventilation, effects of grouting and of 
stray materials, the EDZ (principally an issue in clay and 
salt host rocks) and biological activity. 
Consideration of 'pre-closure processes' and 
potential approaches to managing their effects suggests 
that, although they do need to be taken into account, they 
do not pose a significant obstacle to demonstrating 
acceptable levels of repository safety. 
V.B. Processes Issues and Repository Design 
A number of requirements, constraints and processes 
will influence the design of a repository and the EBS. In 
repositories for spent fuel and high-level wastes, heat 
from the waste will be the primary factor determining the 
temperatures that will develop. Repository temperature is 
an important constraint on repository design. In order to 
build confidence in the suitability of a repository design, 
it is necessary to conduct an iterative series of 
assessments of repository performance and disposal 
system safety. These assessments need to take account of 
repository evolution and this can be achieved by 
considering a range of scenarios. It is also essential that 
such assessments are based an a sufficient level of 
process understanding and associated data. 
Studies aimed at refining and optimising the design 
of a repository need to consider a wide range of different 
types of information, including, results from feasibility, 
cost, performance and safety assessments for alternative 
repository and EBS designs. Repository design might be 
optimised in respect of heat production by adjusting waste 
canister spacing so that the waste inventory can be 
disposed of within acceptable temperature and safety 
limits, and the costs of repository excavation remain 
reasonable. 
VI. MODELLING: ROLE IN THE SAFETY CASE 
EBS Project Workshop 3 [8] focused on the role of 
modelling in supporting the safety case. 
V1.A. Status of Available Models 
The radioactive waste disposal community has 
developed, tested and applied many capable modelling 
tools, and although there may be some programme- 
specific gaps and more data may be required, the 
capability exists to model and assess most processes and 
process couplings. For example, capable two and three- 
dimensional modelling codes have been developed to 
simulate thermal, hydraulic, mechanical; and chemical 
(THMC) processes in repository systems and the 
couplings amongst them. 
Such models can be beneficial in terms of developing 
and demonstrating understanding of disposal system 
behaviour (e.g., Fig. 2). However, limitations exist in the 
availability of data with which to parameterize coupled 
THMC models, particularly at elevated temperatures, and 
further limitations arise from the increased computational 
complexity and effort required to fully evaluate 
uncertainties in strongly coupled systems. 
There are also potentially significant difficulties 
associated with the rigorous application and validation of 
some types of coupled process models over time and 
length scales relevant to disposal system safety 
assessment. As a result of these limitations and potential 
difficulties, pragmatic decisions have to be taken 
regarding the degree to which it is appropriate to directly 
incorporate detailed process-level modelling codes in 
safety analyses. 
V1.B. Relationship between PAISA Models and 
Process Models 
To understand how PA/SA models and process 
models relate to each other, it is first appropriate to 
broadly define their roles in the safety case. Process 
models describe the potential behaviour of subsystems 
(by considering the processes controlling them) over a 
potentially large range of boundary conditions. One of the 
key messages to come out of process modelling is that the 
basic science is well understood and captured by the 
given process or research model. PAISA models, on the 
other hand, evaluate the possible range of expected 
system behaviour (rather than subsystem behaviour) and, 
as such, often constrain the application of process models 
to a narrower range of behaviour. The PAISA models 
may, thus, provide a coherent, system-wide set of 
conditions and parameter ranges. The key message to 
come out of PAISA models is that the EBS works as 
designed and will fulfill its safety functions. 
Information can be passed between PABA models 
and process models in both directions: 
9 Transferring fundamental safety relevant aspects 
.or functions (physical-chemical processes, such 
as fluid flow and geochemistry) from process 
models to PAISA models is known as the process 
of model abstraction. Transferring data, 
including process model outputs, to the spatial 
and temporal scale of the disposal system is 
known as upscaling. 
9 Transferring information from PAISA models to 
process models can be useful in providing 
consistent boundary conditions to all process 
models. PAISA models can also be used to put 
the results from process modelling studies into 
the wider context so that the significance of 
individual FEPs or combinations of FEPs can be 
understood. 
Of course, the need to manage and record the transfer 
of such information is not only an issue for EBS 
modelling but also applies to geosphere modeling for 
example. However, it is principally in the context of 
considering the EBS, that such information transfer may 
affect repository design. It is, therefore, particularly 
important to ensure appropriate integration between EBS 
modeling at the PAISA and process levels with design 
repository studies. 
VI.B. I .  Model Abstraction 
Model abstraction, upscaling, the specification of 
boundary conditions, and the interpretation of PAISA 
results cannot be hl ly  automated because they require 
expert judgement, but there may be scope to develop 
more formal procedures or guidance on these topics in 
order to improve consistency of approach, transparency 
and QA. 
It is tempting to assume that model abstraction 
involves a one-way process in which process models are 
simplified to develop PAISA models. However, when 
developing a PAISA model it can be necessary to take 
account of FEPs that do not need to be considered in 
process-modelling studies, such as the geometry and 
spatial heterogeneity of the disposal system. PAISA 
modelling may also need to take account of a range of 
different types of data, such as that from natural analogue 
observations and information on the as-built repository. 
Experience from the more mature programmes that have 
gone through several cycles of PAISA, suggests that the 
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Optimisation should be approached on several levels, 
and programmes aimed at optimising the design of the 
disposal system and the EBS need to include SA, PA and 
process level modelling studies. SA and total system PA 
are best suited to informing choices over large scale 
issues, such as the choice of repository layout and the 
waste inventory. Subsystem PA models and process level 
models may be useful when considering smaller scale 
issues, such as the choice between alternative engineered 
barrier materials. 
More emphasis is also being placed on the use of PA 
and SA models to integrate a wide range of information 
and help in communicating understanding of likely 
disposal system behaviour. Other ongoing and positive 
developments include: 
9 The establishment and use of Safety Function 
Indicators and Safety Functions for components 
of the EBS. In Sweden, SKI3 has developed a 
concept involving the use of defined Safety 
Function Indicators to provide a structured 
approach to linking between PA and EBS and 
repository design [lo]. In Belgium, ONDRAF 1 
NIRAS has identified a series of Safety 
Functions as a means to communicating how the 
disposal facility will achieve safety and to help in 
structuring the design process [ l l ] .  ONDRAF 1 
NIRAS has recently adopted a revised EBS 
design for HLW disposal based on use of a 
Supercontainer [l2]. 
9 Moves towards Requirements Management 
Systems and 'living' PAISA models that will 
provide a traceable record of developments over 
the lifetime of the waste management 
programme. 
As these developments are progressed, there will be a 
need to undertake assessments in an increasingly rigorous 
manner, and to place greater emphasis on quality 
assurance and quality control of the assessment and 
in~plementation process. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The NEA EBS Project is providing an on-going 
international forum for the exchange of ideas and 
information, and is promoting the development of best 
practice by developing structured methods for the design, 
characterisation, assessment and optimisation of 
engineered barriers and radioactive waste repositories and 
the associated safety cases. 
Two project workshops, in particular, considered 
EBS process issues and the role of the modelling in the 
safety case: 
9 Workshop 2, Las Vegas, USA, 14-17 September 
2004 [7]. 
9 Workshop 3, La Coruna, Spain, 24-26 August 
2005) [8]. 
These workshops allowed an assessment of the state- 
of-the-art in 200415 in considering such issues during 
safety case development. 
Workshop 4 will complete the optimisation cycle 
(Fig. 1). It has a provisional title of 'Design Confirmation 
and Demonstration' and may consider: 
9 The application of quality assurance and quality 
control procedures to repository implementation 
and EBS fabrication, construction and 
emplacement. 
9 Programmatic activities that might form part of 
the post-licensing period during repository 
construction and operation, such as monitoring 
of the EBS and testing of models of EBS 
performance. 
9 The types of EBS design modifications that may 
require re-assessment. 
9 The performance and safety analyses that may be 
required to take account of the 'as-built' 
repository. 
9 Results from demonstration experiments and 
large scale tests of the EBS made under realistic 
repository conditions to assess the feasibility and 
problems of implementation. 
It is expected that the Workshop 4 will be held in 
Japan during fall 2006. 
It is also planned to reassess the state-of-the-art 
across all areas covered by the EBS project in 200617 and 
to develop an updated state-of-the-art report. 
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